Formal framework and tools to derive efficient application-level detectors against memory corruption attacks by Yuan, Flore Q.
  
 
 
 
FORMAL FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS TO DERIVE EFFICIENT  
APPLICATION-LEVEL DETECTORS AGAINST MEMORY CORRUPTION ATTACKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
FLORE QIN-YU YUAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Adviser:  
 
  Professor Ravishankar K. Iyer 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
    Memory corruptions figure significantly in currently-observed security attacks.  
The many protection mechanisms which have been proposed to fight against them can be 
broadly classified into two categories: those that focus on preventing vulnerabilities from 
being exploited (canary value, libsafe) and those that focus on preventing important data (e.g. 
return address, critical variable) from being overwritten by attackers (IFS, taintedness 
tracking, WIT, random memory layout). As the range of vulnerabilities increases, we believe 
that protecting all vulnerabilities with specific techniques begins to be unrealistic; 
consequently, we wish to focus on the second category. This thesis proposes to use an 
existing formal tool, SymPLAID, to find the minimum set of critical memory locations one 
needs to protect. The analysis results are also used to derive selective detectors which are 
guaranteed to detect a given attack model. We demonstrate the methodology by deriving 
application-specific detectors which are guaranteed to detect all attacks where the attacker's 
goal is to corrupt the application's end result by modifying one memory location. Very few 
well-placed detectors are needed to get a 100% coverage for the given attack model.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Memory corruption attacks represent a major part of security attacks reported in 
recent years [1]. Applications written in unsafe languages like C or C++ are still numerous 
and are vulnerable to attacks exploiting memory errors like buffer overflow and underflow 
[2], [3] dangling pointers [4], or double frees [5].  
As for defensive techniques, the most complete solutions often incur either high 
runtime or memory space overhead (e.g. duplication of critical data). Furthermore, coverage 
and false positive rates are often determined by testing the protection mechanism against 
known attacks [6], [7] and/or by theoretical ad-hoc deductions [7], [8].  
Testing a security technique's coverage is a difficult task; different methodologies 
suffer from limitations. Based on our readings and experience, validation techniques can be 
classified into two broad categories: experimental validation and formal validation. (Table 1 
summarizes the discussion presented below.) 
- Experimental validation techniques rely on testing the protection mechanisms 
against either crafted attacks or real, already-known attacks.  
o As there is no database of real attacks available for research purposes, it is 
rather difficult to gather a large set of attacks against which to test the 
protection mechanism. Bug and vulnerability reports usually do not 
contain enough information to allow an attack to be reproduced. Therefore, 
reproducing a large set of such attacks can be very time consuming. 
o Crafting attacks can also be very time-consuming as one has to understand 
what vulnerabilities need to be introduced in the system or applications 
and how to exploit them.   
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Table 1: Classification of validation techniques and their limitations 
Categories Limitations 
Formal Validation 
Writing proof by hand 
/ Ad-hoc reasoning 
- Difficult to make exhaustive  
- Ad-hoc reasoning does not supply rigorous 
proofs 
Using model checkers 
and theorem provers  
- Need expertise in formal methods 
- Need to model the protection mechanism 
and the environment 
- Scalability problem due to software state 
explosion 
Experimental Validation 
Using real attacks 
- No attack database available for research 
purpose 
- How many attacks are needed to get an 
accurate idea of coverage? 
- Which attacks should be chosen? 
Using crafted attacks 
- Time-consuming  
- How many attacks are needed to get an 
accurate assessment of coverage? 
- Which attacks should be chosen? 
o Furthermore, such validation can only guarantee the effectiveness of the 
protection mechanisms for the tested attacks. It is hard to determine which 
attacks need to be tested against and how many of them are needed. The 
guarantee obtained by experimental validation only applies to the tested 
attacks unless proved otherwise. For example, showing that a detection 
mechanism can detect a certain format string attack does not prove that the 
detection mechanism covers all format string attacks.    
- Formal validation techniques rely on reasoning and proofs to validate a 
protection mechanism.  
o Manual proofs and ad-hoc reasoning are usually not sufficient to guarantee 
the coverage of a protection mechanism. Indeed, it is difficult to enumerate 
all possible cases and scenarios and reason about them. It is particularly 
difficult for the human mind to think about corner cases. Unfortunately, in 
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the case of security, zero-days attacks that exploit hard-to-find 
vulnerabilities are frequent. 
o Model checkers and theorem-provers are good alternatives to ensure a 
complete analysis of the coverage of a protection mechanism. However, 
this usually requires expertise in formal methods and effort to model the 
protection mechanism, the execution environment, and the attacks. 
Furthermore, as models become more complicated and detailed, formal 
methods usually do not scale well due to state explosion issues. 
As an alternative, this thesis explores the following idea: instead of designing 
detectors and then verifying their coverage, why not use a formal environment to help derive 
detectors which, by design, achieve the coverage expected? 
 The formal environment used in this thesis is an existing tool: SymPLAID [9], 
developed by the DEPEND group at the University of Illinois. SymPLAID has a built-in 
machine model and a symbolic fault-injector. We leverage SymPLAID to analyze 
applications’ behavior under fault in order to find memory locations that can be corrupted to 
achieve an attacker’s goal (e.g. get into the system using invalid password). The analysis 
result is then used to derive protection mechanisms against memory corruption attacks. We 
implemented and placed the derived detectors within the formal framework itself, and we 
show that only a few well-placed detectors are needed to achieve high coverage for the attack 
models we studied. The approach followed is described in Chapter 2 and the attack model 
studied is fully defined in Chapter 3. 
 The main contributions of this thesis are the following:  
i. The research leverages SymPLAID to determine the set of critical data and 
code sections that must be protected for a given set of inputs. The idea is to 
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use exhaustive symbolic fault injections to identify the set of memory 
addresses which can potentially be corrupted by an attacker. 
ii. The work proposes the design of a duplication-based detector to prevent the 
corruption of critical data. 
iii. We model and verify the coverage of the proposed detectors within the 
SymPLAID framework.  
iv. Finally, the thesis describes techniques to minimize the analysis time needed 
to find critical variables.   
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Chapter 2: Approach Overview 
 This section presents an overview of the approach adopted to (i) identify what to 
protect (e.g. what data and/or computation) and where to place the protection mechanisms, 
and (ii) validate constructed detectors. 
2.1 Symbolic fault injection 
We leverage an existing formal tool, SymPLAID, to inject symbolic faults and 
analyze the behavior of an application under faults. SymPLAID runs on top of the Maude 
model checker [10] and models applications’ execution at the assembly level (MIPS 
assembly in our case) using rewriting logic [11]. SymPLAID-supported symbolic fault 
injection introduces a single error (―err‖ symbol) per execution in one memory location and 
propagates the error’s consequences using symbolic execution. The results from the symbolic 
fault injections are then used to determine memory locations that need to be protected and to 
design and place protection mechanisms.  
Fault injection can be used to find memory locations which need to be protected in 
order to prevent malicious attacks. Independently of the vulnerabilities exploited [12] (buffer 
overflow, format string, third party libraries etc.), all memory corruption attacks involve the 
corruption of at least one memory location. Injecting symbolic faults allows us to consider all 
possible corruptions at the value in a given memory location and thus conduct an exhaustive 
analysis of the application’s behavior under faults. It is important to note that one of the main 
assumptions made in this work is that all memory corruption attacks can be modeled by 
targeted fault injections. 
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2.2 Tool chain flow 
The process of going from SymPLAID’s formal analysis to the identification of data 
and code to protect, and finally to the design and validation of detectors is partially automated. 
The complete tool chain flow used in this study is illustrated in Figure 1 and described in 
Table 2.  
Table 2: Tool chain flow description 
 Automated
/manual 
description 
STEP 1: Translation 
of the assembly code 
into equations 
Automated 
 
- The user supplied application’s assembly is 
translated into an equational representation of 
the code defined by SymPLAID (―Maude 
assembly‖).  
- Go to step 2. 
STEP 2: Fault 
Injection 
Automated  - The ―Maude assembly‖ is fed to SymPLAID.  
- Fault injection is conducted using the fault 
model (initially only one memory location 
can be corrupted by the attacker) and the 
detector model (initially no detector) 
implemented in SymPLAID. 
- Go to step 3. 
STEP 3: Parsing 
SymPLAID’s result 
Automated  SymPLAID’s results are parsed in order to determine 
which memory location can be successfully corrupted 
by an attacker to achieve his/her goal (e.g. get 
authenticated with invalid login information). 
- If no memory location can be successfully 
corrupted by an attacker to achieve his/her 
goal, then the application is resilient to the 
studied attack model. Go to step 5. 
- If there are memory locations that can be 
successfully corrupted by an attacker to 
achieve his/her goal, go to step 4. 
STEP 4: Refining 
the detector model 
Manual - Use SymPLAID’s results as an indication of 
what to protect and where to insert protection.  
- Implement or refine the detector model.  
- Instrument the application if necessary. 
- Go to Step 2. 
STEP 5: Refining 
the attack model 
Manual - If the user determines that it is necessary to 
consider a more advanced fault model (e.g. several 
memory locations can be corrupted by the 
attacker) then add or refine the fault model and go 
to step 2.  
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Figure 1: Tool chain flow 
 
As shown in Table 2, the symbolic fault injections as well as the analysis of the 
injections’ results are automated. The only manual effort required from the user is the 
implementation, within the framework, of the detector models and of more advanced attack 
models if needed. We show in following chapters that adding or refining detector models 
within the framework requires a little effort and expertise in formal methods.  
Furthermore, once implemented, detector models and attack models can be reused 
across analysis, which again reduces the manual effort required from the user.  
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Chapter 3: Definitions and Attack Model 
 This chapter defines the threat model considered in the work and introduces basic 
definitions and properties used throughout the thesis.  
3.1 Attack model 
In this work, we consider application-level memory corruption attacks that alter 
the integrity of an application. This section further explains the above definition. 
Application-level attacks: The goal of an application level attack is not to corrupt the 
behavior or gain control of the whole system (e.g. launch a root shell) but to alter the normal 
behavior of the attacked application (corrupted output, login with wrong password etc.). 
Application level attacks can be achieved by using memory corruption vulnerabilities (e.g. 
buffer overflow, format string), or by changing the code of an application (e.g. trojan). We 
focus on application level attacks conducted by memory corruption.  
Memory Corruption Attacks: All attacks that either corrupt data or the control flow of 
an application (or both) by overwriting data or addresses in memory are considered memory 
corruption attacks. That includes, for example, the usual buffer overflow, integer overflow, 
and format string attacks, but also logic bombs or third party libraries that modify memory 
locations they semantically are not allowed to modify. 
Integrity of an application: In this work, it is considered that the attacker’s goal is to 
alter the integrity of data produced by the application, i.e. corrupt data produced by the 
application. Therefore, we do not consider attacks targeting the confidentiality of data, where 
the goal is to steal information from the application.   
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Furthermore, it is assumed in this work that the attacker does not want to crash the 
application. Any attacks leading to a system exception being raised or a system crash are 
considered to be "detectable" attacks and thus are not considered.  
3.2 Terminology 
The following terms are used throughout this thesis. 
 3.2.1 Definitions 
Critical variable (or critical memory location):  
 A critical variable or critical memory location is a memory location that can be 
corrupted by the attacker to achieve a particular goal (e.g. alter the application's output or 
login with an invalid password). 
Critical code sections associated with critical variable M:  
 A critical memory location is always associated with one or several critical code 
sections. A critical code section associated with the critical variable M is the longest 
sequence of consecutive (in terms of execution order) assembly instructions during the 
execution of which M can be corrupted by the attacker to achieve his/her goal. In other words, 
each critical code section encompasses all consecutive instructions during the execution of 
which M can be corrupted.    
Note that for each possible execution flow a set of critical code sections is derived. 
Therefore, critical sections can overlap for different execution flows.  
3.2.2 Properties of the critical code sections 
 In this section, we introduce and prove two lemmas which characterize unique 
properties of the critical code section. 
 The following notations are introduced to enable the reasoning. 
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Notations:  
- Critical Variable: m 
- Critical code section associated with m:  Cm 
- Execution flow:  𝐸 = 𝑆0
𝐼0
 𝑆1
𝐼1
 …
𝐼𝑖
 𝑆𝑖
𝐼𝑐0
 𝑆𝑖+1
𝐼𝑐1
 …
𝐼𝑐𝑛
 𝑆𝑖+𝑛+1. .
𝐼𝑓
 𝑆𝑓   
where Ii are instructions and Si are machine states (e.g. memory, register, pc) and 
such that {𝐼𝑐𝑗  ,∀𝑗 ∈  0, 𝑛  } = 𝐶𝑚   
- Memory corruption: 𝑆𝑖[𝑀𝐸𝑀([𝑚(𝑑) ← 𝑑′])] denotes the fact that a corrupted 
value d’ is injected into memory location m to replace the legitimate data d during 
state Si. 
- Memory content: 𝑆𝑖[𝑀𝐸𝑀([𝑚 = 𝑑])] denotes the fact that at state Si the memory 
location m contains the data d. 
- Original data in memory m: d 
- Predicate associated with the critical variable m:  
𝑃𝑚 ∶ 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 ×  ℕ × 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒    𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛  such that: 
(𝑃𝑚  𝐸, 𝑖, 𝑑, 𝑑′ = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ) ⟺  (During the execution E, 𝑆𝑖 𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚(𝑑) ←
𝑑′     ⇒  the attacker can achieve his/her goal)  
Intuitively, if we denote Ii the instruction executed to transition from Si-1 to 
Si , the predicate Pm returns true if and only if Ii is part of a critical section 
associated with m.  
Lemma 1: A critical code section associated with the critical memory M always starts 
with a write instruction to M and does not contain any other write to M. 
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Proof:   
1. Proof that a critical code section always starts with a write instruction to the 
associated critical memory location.  
Hypothesis 1: Ic0 is not a write instruction to m  
Hypothesis 2: Ic0 is the first instruction in Cm. 
 Let us prove by contradiction that Ic0 must be a write to m. 
 As 𝐼𝑐0 ∈  𝐶𝑚 , then ∃𝑑
′ , 𝑃𝑚  𝐸, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑑, 𝑑′ = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒.   
 Let us now assume that the attacker has injected d’ in m after the execution of Ii: 
𝑆𝑖 𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚(𝑑) ← 𝑑′   .  
 As Ic0 is not a write instruction into m (hypothesis 1) then 𝑆𝑖 𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚(𝑑) ← 𝑑′    ⇒
 𝑆𝑖+1 𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚 = 𝑑′   . (The data in memory address m has not been changed.)  
 However we know that 𝑃𝑚  𝐸, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑑, 𝑑′ = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 and therefore 𝑆𝑖+1 𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚(𝑑) ←
𝑑′    ⇒ the attacker can achieve his/her goal.  
 By transitivity of the implication operator we have  𝑆𝑖 𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚(𝑑) ← 𝑑′    ⇒  the 
attacker can achieve his/her goal. Therefore, 𝐼𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑚  , which is in contradiction with the 
hypothesis 2.   
 Therefore Ic0 must be a write to m. 
2. Proof that there is only one write instruction to m within each critical code 
section associated to m. 
Hypothesis 1: Let us suppose that there exists an instruction 𝐼𝑐𝑗 ≠ 𝐼𝑐0  which is a write 
instruction to m.  
 We denote by Scj-1 the machine state before the execution of Icj and by Scj the machine 
state after the execution of Icj. 
 We denote by d the value written into memory m by Icj. 
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 Let us suppose that the attacker injects in state Scj-1 a malicious value: 
𝑆𝑐𝑗−1 𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚(𝑑) ← 𝑒𝑟𝑟     
 Icj writes the value d in m; therefore  𝑆𝑐𝑗  𝑀𝐸𝑀  𝑚 = 𝑑    overwriting the value 
introduced by the attacker.  
 Therefore Icj-1 cannot be in a critical section associated with m.  
 However, Icj-1 is executed after Ic0 and before Icj and a critical code section is 
constituted of consecutive instructions; therefore by definition Icj-1 is in the critical 
code section. This contradicts the previous statement.  
 Therefore hypothesis 1 does not hold. 
Conclusion: This proves that there can be only one write instruction within each 
critical section and it is the first instruction. 
Lemma 2: The instruction following the last instruction of the critical section is always a 
read from the critical memory location (critical variable).  
Proof:  
Hypothesis 1: Im is the last instruction in the critical section and I’ is the instruction 
executed right after Im.  
Hypothesis 2: Let us suppose that I’ does not read the critical memory m. 
Im is in the critical section that implies that there exists a value d’ such that the 
attacker can achieve his goal by writing d’ into memory location m after Im is executed.  That 
also implies that there exists an instruction, Ir, executed after Im that reads m and that the 
corrupted value d’ propagates at least until Ir is executed (if the corrupted value is never read, 
then the attacker cannot alter the behavior of the application).  
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Now, we have assumed that I’ is an instruction that does not read m; therefore 
corrupting m after I’ with the value d’ has the exact same effect as corrupting m after Im: the 
corrupted value d’ is going to propagate until Ir and the attack will succeed. Therefore I’ 
should be in the critical section, which is contradictory with hypothesis 1 (Im is the last 
instruction in the critical section). Therefore the instruction following the last instruction of 
the critical section is always a use of the critical memory.    
Intuitively, the lemmas show that a data in memory can only be corrupted between the 
time it is written in memory and the time it is used. Also, as soon as the data is written into 
memory and as long as it is not used (loaded into registers), any changes to the data will be 
reflected at the next read instruction. 
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Chapter 4: SymPLAID 
SymPLAID is a program level formal framework developed in our research group at 
the Coordinated Science Laboratory. SymPLAID runs on top of the Maude model checker. It 
has been designed to find application vulnerabilities to insider attacks [9] using symbolic 
model checking. In this thesis, we leverage the symbolic fault-injection capabilities of 
SymPLAID along with the flexible design of the machine model in order to design, model 
and verify detection mechanisms. Critical variables along with associated critical code 
sections are identified using SymPLAID’s symbolic fault-injector. Based on the injection 
results, detectors are then designed, modeled and verified within the formal framework. 
 SymPLAID consists of the following components (all written using Maude functional 
modules or Maude system modules): 
- A machine-specific front-end which describes machine properties such as the 
number of available registers, word sizes, instruction sizes, address calculation, the 
instruction set and how the instructions execute. 
- A machine-independent back-end which contains the concrete evaluation model, the 
error model, the fault injection mechanism, and application model. 
Figure 2 is derived from [13] and describes the overall design flow of SymPLAID 
4.1 Input 
The application model is close to the actual MIPS assembly language, so there is no 
manual effort needed to formalize the analyzed applications. A script automates the 
translation of the assembly program into a Maude functional module [14]. Figure 3 shows a 
simple factorial program translated into a formal module using the translation script in 
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Perl. The formal module declares the application’s functions, labels and base addresses as 
operators (Line 2, 3 Figure 3). The definition of each operator is then written using equations.   
Figure 2: Conceptual design flow of SymPLAID 
 
 
Each function operator (here the factFunc operator) involves two equations:  
- A first equation indicates the base memory address of the text segment associated 
with the function (Line 4, Figure 3).  
- A second equation defines a raw representation of the function's assembly code in 
Maude which is simply a succession of "labeled instructions" (Line 5, Figure 3).  
First is the label (address) of the first instruction to execute (e.g. factLoc in the given 
example)
 1
 (Line 21, Figure 3). 
                                                          
 
1
 If an application has several functions, first would correspond to the label of the first function to be executed. 
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Input is the input value to the application. In Figure 3, the input value is 5 so the 
application should compute factorial 5 (Line 22, Figure 3). 
The relocate operator (Line 21, Figure 3) grants every instruction a text segment 
address calculated based on the machine's instruction size. 
Figure 3: Factorial program translated into formal module 
 
4.2 Implementation 
SymPLAID is implemented using rewriting logic. Equations are used to model 
deterministic actions such as the program execution or memory and register lookups... Rules 
are used to introduce non deterministic transitions when injecting errors.  
A machine state describes the states of the registers, memory, program counter etc. 
during the execution of an application.  The whole application's execution consists of going 
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from one machine state to another through transitions. Figure 4 lists the fields which define 
the machine state.
2
 
In other words, transitions modeling the fault-free execution of an application are 
written with equations, and transitions involving errors are written with rules.  
Figure 4: Machine state description 
 PC: the label of the instruction to be executed next. 
 out: application output 
 inp: application input 
 regs: register state 
 mem: memory state 
 temp: temporary code 
 ex: exceptions thrown 
 bkpts: breakpoint list 
 step: number of rewriting steps left 
 numInsts: the number of instruction executed 
 cons: constraints on the fault injected 
 log: (fault log) records when the fault has been injected and when it has been 
activated (optional ) 
 hist: records every random jumps due to error in the program counter. 
(optional) 
 
4.3 Error injection 
The error injection mechanism mimics the behavior of existing fault injectors such as 
NFTAPE [15]. A breakpoint is set at a given application's execution point. When the 
breakpoint is reached, the err symbol is injected at one memory location. Then, the 
application's execution resumes propagating the error.   
                                                          
 
2
 The machine state is easily extensible.  
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4.3.1 Error injection mechanism 
At each run, the user is able to specify where to inject the symbolic error (into register, 
memory or program counter). In this thesis, as we wish to model memory corruption attacks, 
we only consider memory errors. The user is also able to specify when to inject the error by 
setting breakpoints. By default, SymPLAID exhaustively and successively injects errors at 
every available memory location and at every possible breakpoint. Figure 5 illustrates the 
exhaustive fault injection process. Within each state, ai denotes memory location i and ai = 
err denotes the fact that the memory location ai contains the error symbol. Note that there is 
at most one error injected on each path of the state diagram shown below.  
Figure 5: State diagram of error injection of all memory addresses at all possible 
breakpoints 
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The initial state is a state where no instruction has been executed yet. After instruction 
1 is executed, n1 + 1 states can be reached from the initial state (n1 being the number of 
memory locations available). In n1 state, a unique symbolic error err is injected. In the first 
state, an error is injected into memory location 1, and in the i
th
 state an error is injected into 
memory location i. Once injected, each error is propagated independently from the others. 
The (n1 + 1)
th
 state is an error-free state from which new states are ―forked‖ after the 
execution of the 2
nd
 instruction.     
Table 3 shows some of the injection commands defined in SymPLAID. The Search 
command defined in Maude enables us to explore all reachable states from the initial state 
given the specified injections. The next section discusses the set of rules and equations that 
control how errors are injected.  
Table 3: Basic commands to inject memory errors using SymPLAID and Maude 
Maude commands Explanation 
Search allMemoryErrors (program, 
first, input) =>! (S:State) 
Search all reachable states after injecting one 
and only one symbolic error into all possible 
memory locations at all possible breakpoints. 
Search allMemoryErrors(program, 
first, input) =>! (S:State) such that 
getException(S:State) == noException . 
Search all reachable states where the exception 
field is equal to 'no exception' after injecting one 
and only one symbolic error into all possible 
memory locations at all possible breakpoints. 
Search allMemoryErrosWithin 
(program, first, input, pcmin, pcmax) 
=>! (S:State) 
Search all reachable states after injecting one 
and only one symbolic error into all possible 
memory locations and where breakpoints PCs 
are between pcmin and pcmax. 
4.3.2 Injection rules and equations 
This section describes the main equations and rules used to perform the symbolic fault 
injection. Other equations and rules may need to be modified or added depending on the error 
injection model chosen, but equations and rules presented here are the starting point for any 
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error injection model modification. In particular, the state model, the error propagation rules 
and the constraint solver may need to be modified accordingly. 
3
 
Notations:  Let C be a Code, lb and L Labels, I an Instruction, In the input, MemError 
an errorType (memory error), M a memory, a an address, and v a value. 
Equation 1:   
eq allMemoryErrors (C,lb,In)=allError(C,lb,In,MemError) . 
 Explanation: SymPLAID enables the injection of symbolic fault into memory, register 
and PC and this equation allows the definition of an unique "initialization rule" (rule 1 
defined below) and one "injection start equation" (equation 2 defined below) for all three 
types of injections. To enable the injection of a new fault model, it is sufficient to define a 
new errorType corresponding to the new fault model and add an equation similar to equation 
1. Rule 1 and equation 2 can then be reused. 
 Rule 1 (Initialization rule):  
rl allErrors([L,I]C,lb,In,Type) => injectStart([L,I]C,lb,In,Type,L) . 
 Explanation: In Maude, rules are used to introduce nondeterminism. If the analyzed 
code, C, is composed of n instructions {[L0, I0][L1 , I1] ...[Ln,In]} this rule is equivalent 
to:  ∀𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑛] ; from the initial state S0 we can either transition to a state where Li is set to be 
a breakpoint or a state where Li is not set to be a breakpoint. That allows the model checker to 
consider all possible breakpoints when looking for all reachable states: each instruction, I, 
can either be set to be a breakpoint or not. For example, to model an attack where the attacker 
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 In this work we did not implement any new error model in SymPLAID. We only point out in this section rules 
and equations that may need to be modified. 
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can modify n different memory addresses from m different breakpoints, this is the equation to 
change in order to add breakpoints. (Note: A conditional rule exists to limit the choice of the 
breakpoint pcs to be between an min and a max label. It is mostly similar to the rule given 
above except that we also check that min < Li < max.) 
 Equation 2 (Injection starts equation ):  
eq injectStart(C,lb,In,Type,L)= injectError( { C, < fetch(C, st),init(st, bkpts(L) inp(In) 
step(noStep) log(Empty) )> },type, L) . 
Explanation: Equation 2 allows an injection campaign to start given that one 
breakpoint pc, L, has been chosen.  
 Rule 2 (Error injection rule):  
crl [do-injection]: injectError( { C , < I , PC(L) Mem( (a = v) M) bkpts(BL) 
S > },MemError, L ) =>{ C, < I, PC(L) Mem( [a <- err] M) bkpts(removeBkpt(L, BL)) S > } 
if ( not isTerminal(L) and (L in BL) ) . 
Explanation: When a breakpoint pc, Li0, is reached and it is not the end of the 
execution, this conditional rule is equivalent to the following:  
Denote by ni0 the number of memory locations used in the application's memory space 
at the breakpoint Li0.  
Let {a0 , a1, ... ani0 } be the set of memory addresses used in the memory space of the 
application at the breakpoint Li0.   
 ∀j ∈ [0, ni0] from the state S = { C , < I , PC(L) Mem( (aj = v) M) bkpts(BL) S > } a 
transition exists to a state S’ where either  
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 -   An error is injected into memory address aj and the breakpoint Li0 is removed from 
the list of breakpoint: S’ = { C, < I, PC(L) Mem( [aj <- err] M) bkpts(removeBkpt(Li0, BL)) 
S >}  
- Or there is no error injected into memory address aj.  
The equations and rules presented above allow the model checker to find all reachable 
states when considering all possible memory injections of 1 memory address at a particular 
breakpoint. This rule would be modified to introduce more complex attacks where an attacker 
can corrupt m memory addresses at a particular breakpoint.   
4.4 Error propagation 
Once the error is injected into the program, the error is propagated. Every operation 
involving err will return error expressions merging err symbols (e.g. err + 2 = err, err + err 
= err).  
The interesting part of the error propagation is how the tool handles branching or 
comparison involving the err symbol. In the cases where branching and comparison are not 
involved, merging expressions into err is sufficient. But if we need to evaluate a predicate in 
order to determine how to branch, merging expressions into err is no longer possible. 
SymPLAID uses rules to fork the execution when evaluating a predicate involving the err 
symbol: in other words, a predicate containing an err symbol is evaluated to both true and 
false. 
Take the example of the factorial module presented in Figure 3. Say an error 
propagated into register 3 ($3). After instruction 5 executes, the error propagates into register 
5 ($5). When evaluating whether the value in register 5 ($5) equals to 0, SymPLAID forks 
the execution. Figure 6 illustrates this example by showing part of the state diagram 
representing all reachable states. 
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Figure  6: Example of propagation of err into a branch predicate  
 
However, in this case, the error in register 3 continues to propagate; therefore, at the 
next loop iteration, register 5 will still contain an error (whose value is not constrained).  That 
means that we will fork forever, and that is why SymPLAID uses bounded search (the 
number of rewriting steps allowed to reach a state is bounded) to ensure that the analysis 
ends.  
4.5 Constraint solver 
The error abstraction enables us to reason about a whole category of errors without 
having to provide a special value for it. The major problem with this abstraction is the 
presence of false positives. To limit the number of false positives, SymPLAID has a built-in 
constraint solver. The constraint solver keeps track of constraints SymPLAID can identify on 
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an err symbol. Consider the following dummy instructions and assume that register 5 
contains the err symbol: 
--- branch if the value in register 5 is greater than 0 
[ 2 | ( bgtzali $(5) #(0) #(4) ) ] 
[ 3 | (subi $(5) $(5) $(1) )] 
--- branch if the value in register 5 is less than 2 
[ 4 | ( bltzali $(5) #(3) #(7) ) ]  
Note that each time register 5 is used in an instruction the constraint on register 5 is 
updated. Furthermore, the constraints are merged whenever possible. However, if we have a 
case of incompatible constraints (e.g. $5 ≤ −1 and $5 ≥ 3 in our case, Figure 7), the state with 
the incompatible constraints is discarded (red state in Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Example of constraint propagation 
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Figure 7 presents the state diagram associated with the above instructions.  
The final constraint on the err symbol is given to the user as a part of SymPLAID’s 
results. That indicates the values or range of values the err symbol should carry in order to 
achieve a given result. In other words, the constraints on err represent values or range of 
values an attacker should inject in order to achieve a given goal.  
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Chapter 5: SymPLAID Validation 
Before using the results from SymPLAID’s analysis to identify critical variables and 
critical code sections, we first evaluated the false positive rate of the tool. The goal was to 
ensure that injecting a fault on real systems in any variable identified as critical would allow 
the attacker to achieve his/her goal.  
This section describes and explains the results obtained from the evaluation of 
SymPLAID. The application chosen for this analysis is the sorting algorithm, Bubblesort,
4
 
from the Stanford benchmark. In this evaluation, SymPLAID was asked to return all memory 
corruptions that would lead the application to return a corrupted output (e.g. non-sorted list, 
corrupted value in the output) without system crash or any system exception being raised. A 
tuple {breakpoint pc: I , memory location to corrupt: m, value to inject: d} is considered to be 
a false positive in the following cases:  
- Injecting, on a MIPS system, the value d in memory address m at the breakpoint I 
does not impact the normal behavior of Bubblesort. In other words, Bubblesort 
returns the correct sorted list.  
- Injecting, on a MIPS system, the value d in memory address m at the breakpoint I 
results in a system crash and/or system exception being thrown. 
To evaluate the false positive rate of SymPLAID, an automated framework has been 
set up to allow the user to 
 generate scripts and run parallel SymPLAID analyses of a given program on 
the Trusted-ILLIAC cluster [16]. Each cluster node performs one job which 
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 Most false positives identified by this analysis were due to features in SymPLAID that are independent of the 
application analyzed (constraint solver, additional state fields). Therefore we believe that the results presented in 
this section are valid for any application.   
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consists of one SymPLAID analysis. Each job is responsible for injecting 
memory errors in all memory addresses available in the application’s memory 
space at n consecutive breakpoint instructions (with n defined by the user).  
 parse and filter the results (states) returned by SymPLAID. 
 inject all tuples {breakpoint pc, memory location, fault value} found 
by SymPLAID during the execution of the analyzed application in the 
SimpleScalar [17] simulator to evaluate the false positive rate of SymPLAID. 
 
5.1 Analysis of SymPLAID’s result  
The analysis of Bubblesort in SymPLAID ran on the Trusted-ILLIAC cluster. 
Bubblesort consists of 96 assembly instructions. As an input, a list of 10 numbers from 0 to 9 
was provided to Bubblesort. SymPLAID was asked to find all memory corruptions that could 
lead the program to finish without crashing or throwing any exceptions.  
The analysis was divided into 32 subtasks (running on 32 nodes), each of which had 
to inject faults within 2 or 3 consecutive instructions (using the 3
rd
 command presented in 
Table 3). The longest jobs took about 8 hours and were cancelled due to ―node failures.‖5 On 
average, though, jobs took less than 1 hour to complete, which seems to be a reasonable 
analysis time given that each job corresponds on average to the injection of all 2
8
 possible 
values in each memory location (about 30 memory locations in this case) at 2 or 3 
consecutive breakpoints. That would correspond at least to 23 * 30 * 2 = 15360 injections 
with a regular fault injector. We present, in a later chapter, methodologies to reduce the 
number of injection needed while preserving the completeness of the analysis.  
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 We think that those node failures were caused by an excessive memory usage from the model checker.  
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SymPLAID generates as output all reachable states given the fault injections. We 
filter the states returned by SymPLAID in order to select only those with an incorrect output 
(unsorted list/ wrong number of output numbers/ wrong list of number in the output). From 
each state obtained after filtering we identify a tuple which represents a possible memory 
corruption attack: {breakpoint pc, memory location corrupted, constraint on the value to 
inject}. In the remainder of this thesis, such a tuple is interchangeably called a solution, tuple 
or possible memory corruption. For Bubblesort, SymPLAID returned 48,622 possible 
memory corruptions or solutions. Figure 8 represents the number of possible memory 
corruptions identified by SymPLAID per job.  
Figure 8: Number of possible memory corruptions per job 
  
From Figure 8 we may observe the following: 
 Five jobs did not return any solution, which means that altering any data in 
memory after the instructions analyzed in those five jobs would either lead to 
one of three outcomes: either the program will crash, an exception will be 
thrown, or there will be no consequence for the application’s behavior. 
Therefore, no protection is needed during the execution of those instructions.    
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 Thirteen jobs out of 32 gave more than 2000 possible memory corruptions. 
The high number of possible corruptions demonstrates that attacks that corrupt 
any memory location when the instructions analyzed in those 13 jobs are being 
executed have a better chance to succeed. This indicates that "critical code 
sections", as defined earlier, exist within an application. In other words, some 
sections of an application are more sensitive to memory corruption.  
5.2 False positive rate validation 
We wrote Python scripts to automate the following tasks: 
 derive from the data returned by SymPLAID, tuples representing possible 
memory corruptions (or solutions): {Breakpoint pc, memory location 
corrupted, constraint on the value to inject};  
 perform automated fault injection, based on the information contained in each 
tuple, in the SimpleScalar simulator; and 
 gather and parse the injections’ results.  
SimpleScalar [17] is an open source computer architecture simulator. In particular, 
SimpleScalar simulates MIPS architectures. An injector
6
 implemented as a part of 
SimpleScalar’s debugger DLite was used to perform the injections.  
All 48,622 solutions were injected using within SimpleScalar. Because the whole 
fault-injection process was automated, all injections were performed within 4 hours.   
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 The injector was implemented previously in our research group. 
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5.2.1 Injected values 
SymPLAID does not always return a precise value to inject but instead gives 
constraints on the value to inject. Table 4 shows the values
7
 we choose to inject given 
SymPLAID’s constraints. 
Table 4: Value injected based on SymPLAID’s constraints 
SymPLAID's  constraint Value injected 
err=x x 
x<err<y x+1 
x<err x+2 
err<y y-2 
no constraint random 
5.2.2 Injection result analysis 
Figure 9 shows the results of the fault injections in SimpleScalar. The red and blue 
sections represent false positives.  
After analyzing the injection results we found the following: 
 Within all 48,622 possible memory corruptions reported by SymPLAID there 
are fully redundant tuples, which means that they share the same breakpoint PC, 
the same constraint on the value to inject and the same memory locations where 
the fault is injected. In Figure 4, which describes the machine states’ fields, we 
note that there is a Step field and a numInsts field. Those fields represent the 
number of rewriting steps undergone by the model checker in order to reach the 
reported state. If those fields differ in two final states, the model checker reports 
two different solutions, even if all other fields are identical. It is possible to get 
rid of all the redundant tuples by adding a new operand in the module defining a 
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 The values chosen are arbitrary. 
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State: getSubstate. The getSubstate operand would return all the fields 
composing a State except for the step and numInsts fields. Issuing the command: 
search getSubstate(allMemoryErrors(program,first,input)) =>! (S:State) returns 
all different reachable substates. After filtering all redundant tuples, we reduced 
the number of solutions to 4833 distinct solutions 
  Analyzing all 4833 distinct solutions allowed us to find that most false 
positives were due to the constraint solver not being able to determine a correct 
constraint on the value to inject. 
 The rest of the false positives are due to loops. When requesting SymPLAID to 
inject fault at a breakpoint pc x, SymPLAID is going to inject a fault each time 
Figure 9: Results from the fault injections 
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the instruction x is reached. For example, in a loop in which instruction x is 
executed twice, SymPLAID will assume two distinct sets of injection runs. The 
first set of injections will inject err at all possible memory locations when 
instruction x is reached the first time; the second set of injections will inject err 
at all possible memory locations when instruction x is reached the second time. 
While injecting in SimpleScalar, however, we always inject the error the first 
time instruction x is reached. which leads to discrepancies between the two sets 
of results. 
As a conclusion to this evaluation, we found that the false positive rate is reduced 
from 4% down to 2% when false positives introduced by the constraint solver
8
 are ignored. In 
that case, more than 98% of solutions identified by SymPLAID actually lead to a corruption 
of the application’s output and can be used to identify critical variables and critical code 
sections.  
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 As our goal is to find critical variables and critical code sections, the constraint on the value to inject is not 
important for our work. Therefore, we can ignore the false positives introduced by the constraint solver without 
adding false positives in the identification of critical variables and critical code sections.  
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Chapter 6: Deriving Detectors 
This chapter describes: (i) how to identify critical variables and critical code sections 
using SymPLAID’s symbolic fault injector, (ii) the critical variables and critical code 
sections identified for the two benchmark applications (WuFTP and OpenSSH), and (iii) the 
design, implementation and coverage evaluation of detectors derived in our formal 
framework for the two target applications.  
6.1 Identifying critical variables and critical sections 
As defined in Chapter 3, critical variables and critical sections are, respectively, 
memory locations that can be altered by an attacker to achieve a particular goal and the time 
frames during which an attack can occur. We use SymPLAID to perform an exhaustive fault 
injection campaign, where we inject all possible memory errors (represented as symbolic 
errors) at all possible breakpoints (corresponding to instructions within the program) and 
examine the resulting effect on the application's execution leveraging the symbolic fault-
injector. All benign faults (no observable corruption) and all faults leading to crashes or 
exceptions raised are then filtered.  
The discovery of critical variables and critical section as a result of 
running SymPLAID is demonstrated on two application stubs, namely the authentication stub 
of OpenSSH and the authentication and log stub of WuFTP.  
We assume in the following sections (6.1.1 and 6.1.2) that the attacker’s goal is to 
alter the application’s behavior. To do so, he/she has the capability of corrupting a single 
memory location during the execution of the application. 
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6.1.1 WuFTP  
 WuFTP is an open-source implementation of a File Transfer Protocol (ftp) server 
written in C [18]. The WuFTP stub we consider in this work translates into 252 assembly 
instructions and performs the following tasks: get the user name, get the password, and, if the 
password is correct, display ―correct login. Enter path‖ and log the path provided by the user. 
If the password is wrong, however, WuFTP displays ―Incorrect Password‖ and exits. The 
injection results are then filtered to only retain those where the attacker got authenticated 
even if the entered password was incorrect. 
The analysis in SymPLAID ran on the Trusted-ILLIAC cluster divided into about 130 
parallel jobs. As an input for the analysis, we provided the application with a wrong password. 
All tasks finished within 4 hours without error. SymPLAID’s results were then parsed in 
order to identify all memory locations that could be altered in order to achieve the previously 
stated goal. All identified memory locations were logged as critical variables and we recorded 
all breakpoint pcs where the fault had been injected to identify each variable's critical 
section.  
In order to have a high level understanding of what corresponded to each critical 
variable we mapped each critical variable (or critical memory location) to higher level 
variables (C like variables), which are listed in Table 5. The table also lists, for each variable, 
its critical section within each function. For example, for the memory location associated 
with the string of the correct password, its critical section within the function main is 
between the first instruction of main and the 38th instruction.  
After analyzing SymPLAID’s results, we found 5 high level variables, corresponding 
to 6 different memory locations, that can be modified by an attacker in order to authenticate 
with an invalid password (Table 5 first column). 
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Table 5: Critical variable analysis done on WU-FTP stub (mapping to high level 
variables) 
Name of Critical Variables 
  
Critical section [ pc min - pc max] Stack/heap 
Main Auth-response Check-auth 
string of the correct password [1 - 38 ] [1 - 15] [1 - 16] Heap 
Pointer to the string “Incorrect Password” to be 
compared with “login correct” 
[42 - 45] N/A [26 - 26] Stack 
Pointer to the user entered password N/A [9 - 15] [6 - 14 ] Stack 
Pointer to the correct password N/A [12 - 16] N/A Stack 
Decision making data N/A N/A [17 - 20] Stack 
  
Moreover, for each critical variable, critical code sections, which correspond to the 
time frame where an attack can happen (Table 5 column 2,3,4) were identified. The analysis 
guarantees that outside of those critical sections, critical variables are safe and thus do not 
need to be protected. The width of each critical section provides an understanding of how 
easy or likely it is for an attacker to achieve the corruption of a given critical variable. Indeed, 
if a critical variable can only be modified between instruction i, which stores the value into 
memory, and instruction i+1, which reads the value from memory, it is very hard for the 
attacker to achieve such an attack. To succeed, the attacker has to find a way to stop the 
execution of the application and corrupt the memory location before it is read (e.g. using a 
debugger). On the other hand if a call instruction to a third party library is found within the 
critical section or if an instruction getting input from the user is found within the critical 
section, critical variables may be easily modified by the attacker. 
Figure 10 shows part of the check-auth function and the critical code section 
associated with each critical variable. The critical code section of the string of the correct 
password is limited by dotted lines in this figure. That is because the critical code section 
starts within the check-auth function’s caller function (main) and ends within the function 
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called by check-auth at line 15 (auth-response). For all other critical variables, we can see 
that all critical code sections start with a write instruction to the associated critical variable 
and end before a load instruction from the critical variable.  
Also note that while the stub contains 6 functions—Main, Auth-response, Check-
auth, Store, Auth-approve and Auth-value—SymPLAID did not find any solutions within 
three of them:  store, auth-approve and auth-value. Therefore, in order to achieve the stated 
goal, an attack cannot occur within those functions. In other words, those functions do not 
need to be protected.      
Figure 10: Critical code sections associated with critical variables in check-auth 
function 
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6.1.2 OpenSSH  
OpenSSH is a freely available C implementation of a Secure Shell (SSH) [19]. We 
focus in this work on a stub which contains the authentication mechanism of OpenSSH.  
The same analysis as the one done on the WuFTP stub was performed on the openSSH 
authentication stub. The openSSH stub translates into 473 assembly instructions and performs 
the following tasks: get the user name, get the password, if the password is correct return 1, 
and if the password is wrong return 0. 
The analysis was first performed with a valid username and a wrong password. The 
results were then filtered in order to keep only cases where the attacker got authenticated 
despite providing an invalid password. 
The analysis in SymPLAID ran on the Trusted-ILLIAC cluster and was divided into 
about 250 parallel tasks. Most of the tasks finished within 1 day without error. Eight tasks 
took more than 4 days after which we stopped the analysis.
9
 SymPLAID’s results were then 
parsed in order to identify all memory locations that can be altered in order to achieve the 
previously stated goal.  
The result of the analysis is shown in Table 6. Again, the critical memory locations 
are mapped in this table to higher, C-level, variable for the sake of clarity. 
For OpenSSH, again only small number of critical variables to protect was found.
10
 
The string of the correct password in particular seems to be a major attack point as it can be 
corrupted in order to achieve the stated goal throughout the execution of the whole 
application.  
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 No obvious reasons were found to explain why the analysis did not complete. 
10
 As mentioned in [20], there is one spurious attack SymPLAID finds because the studied ssh stub has its own 
malloc implementation. We do not consider those spurious attacks in our analysis.  
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Table 6: Critical variable analysis done on SSH stub 
Name of Critical 
Variables 
  
Number of instructions in each function after which a successful 
corruption can happen 
Stack/heap  
Main Sys-auth- 
Password 
Auth- 
password 
Allowed-
user 
getpwnam Getpwn 
amallow 
xcrypt   
string of the correct 
password 
[1 - 
41] 
[1-15] [1-17] [1 – 10] [1 – 21] [1 - 14] N/A Heap 
Pointer to the correct 
password 
N/A [20-46] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Stack 
Pointer to user 
entered password 
N/A [41 - 42] N/A N/A N/A N/A [8/31] Stack 
Decision making data N/A [47 - 48] [24-32] N/A N/A N/A N/A Stack 
The same analysis was performed on the openSSH with an invalid username and a 
random password as inputs. The analysis showed that only the string of the correct password 
could be corrupted in order to be authenticated. Furthermore the critical section is very small: 
only two instructions within the main function (from instruction 0 to instruction 3). 
6.2 Deriving detectors 
Once critical variables and critical sections are determined, it is possible to design 
detectors using SymPLAID's framework. We demonstrate that it is easy to model and verify 
detectors within the framework. A simple detector model was designed, placed, and validated 
on the two benchmark application stubs presented earlier: WuFTP stub and the OpenSSH 
authentication stub. It is important to note that the whole design, placement and validation 
process was fairly quick: 2 days to complete for the WuFTP stub and 4 days for the OpenSSH 
authentication stub.   
6.2.1 Detector overview and implementation  
A critical variable at memory address m can only be successfully overwritten within 
its critical section [I0, Im]. We have proved in section 3.2.2 that I0 is the only write instruction 
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to m within the critical section and the instruction executed after Im uses m. Let us denote Rm 
the instruction executed right after Im.  
Detection technique:  
The detection technique proposed in this thesis duplicates the value of memory 
address m into a secure memory region before I0 and compares the value of memory 
address m with the stored duplicated value before Rm. Any corruption of the data stored 
in m will be detected when compared to the stored duplicated value. 
The detectors described above have been implemented within SymPLAID. 
6.2.1.1 Secure memory region 
The secure memory region is modeled by adding in the state model, described in 
section 4.2, Figure 4, a new attribute: CritMem. CritMem is defined as a subtype of memory 
and inherits all the attributes and operators from the initial memory model. The only 
difference between the secure memory region and the initial memory section is that we do not 
allow fault injection into the secure memory region. In other words, corrupted values are 
allowed to propagate in the secure memory region, but the attacker cannot directly alter data 
in this memory section. In practice, that kind of secure memory region could be achieved by 
encrypting stored data, or using memory randomization or special hardware.       
The following equations have been added in the secure memory model in order to 
model a fetch from the secure memory and the comparison of both the original and 
duplicated data.    
        a: address , v: value, CM: CritMem 
        op _in_: Memory Memory -> bool .       
        eq (a = v ) in (a=v)CM = true .  
        eq (a = v) in CM = false [owise] .  
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Access to the secure memory is done by adding 3 new instructions in the instruction 
set: Encoding instructions, decoding instructions and invalidate instructions.  
6.2.1.2 Encoding instructions 
Encoding instructions duplicate data and store them into the secure memory.  The 
following conditional equation (equation 3) describes the execution of an encoding 
instruction which stores the value of register rs into secure memory.  
 Equation 3 Encoding instruction execution:  
ceq [encode-exec] : { C , < (encode rs a ), PC(pc) regs(R) mem(M) critMem(CM) S > } = 
{ C ,  < fetch(C, next(pc)), updateState( updateStore( PC( next(pc) ) regs(R) mem(M) 
critMem( CM[ a <- (R[rs]) ] ) makeProgress(S), a , rs, R) )  >} 
   if ( canMakeProgress(S, pc, timeout)  ) . 
Explanation: The equation first verifies that the execution of the application does not 
end. If there is a next pc to execute and the number of rewriting steps has not reached the 
maximum number defined by the user (cf. section 4.4 for bounded rewriting), the secure 
memory field (critMem) is updated. The update consists of storing the value contained in 
register rs (R[rs]) at address a.     
6.2.1.3 Decoding instructions 
Decoding instructions fetch duplicated data from the secure memory section and 
compare them with the original data stored in memory. If a mismatch is found, then the 
original data has been corrupted and an exception is thrown.  
 Equation 4 Decoding instruction execution:   
ceq [decode-exec] : { C , < (decode a), PC(pc) regs(R) mem(M) critMem(CM) S > } 
=   { C, ( if  ( (a = M[a]) in CM ) 
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then < fetch(C, next(pc)) , PC(next(pc)) regs(R) mem(M) critMem(CM) 
makeProgress(S)> 
          else  < throw (detException(a)) , PC(next(pc)) regs(R) mem(M) critMem(CM) 
makeProgress(S) > fi)}        if ( canMakeProgress(S, pc, timeout)  ) . 
Explanation: Equation 4 describes the execution of a decoding instruction which 
verifies that the data associated with the memory address a is the same as the duplicated data 
stored in the secure memory.  If a mismatch is found, a new type of exception, detException, 
is thrown, ending the execution of the application.   
6.2.1.4 Invalidate instructions 
 For data stored on the stack, we added an invalidate instruction which invalidates the 
duplicated data in the secure memory section when functions return.  
6.2.1.5 Example of implementation 
The detectors proposed in this thesis can be implemented in either software or 
hardware. This paragraph presents an idea of how the detectors can be implemented in 
hardware. The secure memory region can be implemented in a special, secure hardware. 
During encoding phases, the secure hardware keeps track of where duplicated data are stored 
in the secure memory (e.g. using a table). During the decoding stage, the main hardware 
sends to the secure hardware the memory address a along with the data stored in a. The 
secure hardware then can find the duplicated data corresponding to memory address and 
check whether both duplicated data and the data sent by the main memory are identical. If 
both data are identical, then the hardware sends back a signal allowing the execution of the 
application; otherwise an exception is raised.  
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6.2.2 Detector evaluation 
The coverage of the detectors derived using our formal framework is evaluated in the 
context of the WuFTP and the OpenSSH applications (presented in section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). 
The two applications are instrumented with the detectors and SymPLAID based analysis is 
repeated to measure the coverage.  
Encoding and decoding instructions (defined in paragraph 6.1.2.1 and 6.1.2.2) are 
placed in the applications following the critical code sections derived by the formal analysis. 
However, critical code sections are determined for given executions and therefore for given 
application inputs.  
Therefore, to ensure that no instrumentation is missing, the instrumented application 
and SymPLAID’s formal fault injection need to be executed against different inputs in order 
to exercise all possible execution paths.  
A missing encoding instruction will lead to a false positive (an alarm being raised 
even if the application is not attacked). To detect a missing encoding instruction, the 
instrumented application is executed against multiple inputs in order to exercise all possible 
execution paths. If an exception is thrown during one of the executions, a corresponding 
encoding instruction can be added until all runs end without throwing any exceptions.  
 A missing decoding instruction results in a false negative (attack that is not detected). 
To ensure that no decoding instructions are missing and that all encoding/decoding 
instructions are correctly placed in the application’s source code, SymPLAID's symbolic fault 
injection analysis is performed again on the instrumented application while feeding different 
inputs to the application.  
The analysis time for the instrumented application is greatly reduced (less than 30 min 
instead of 4 hours for the non-instrumented application). Indeed, by adding detectors, all the 
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final states with corrupted outputs are reduced into one single state where the attack is 
detected (exception thrown). That reduces the state search space for SymPLAID as the tool is 
asked to search for final states where no exceptions are thrown.  
This set of analysis uncovers holes in the protection mechanisms proposed above. 
Indeed, because decoding instructions were inserted before the actual read instruction, 
SymPLAID detected that there is still a small window left for an attacker to exploit a time-of-
check-time-of-use vulnerability. This window can be removed by placing decoding 
instructions after the read instructions and by changing the decoding instructions to compare 
the value already loaded into the register and the duplicated value stored into the secure 
memory.  The following equation (equation 5) defines the modified decoding instruction 
execution.      
Equation 5 Decoding instruction execution modified:   
ceq [decode-exec] : { C , < (decode a rs), PC(pc) regs(R) mem(M) critMem(CM) 
S > } =  { C, ( if  ( (a = R[rs]) in CM ) 
then < fetch(C, next(pc)) , PC(next(pc)) regs(R) mem(M) critMem(CM) 
makeProgress(S)>  
else  < throw (detException(a)) , PC(next(pc)) regs(R) mem(M) critMem(CM) 
makeProgress(S) > fi)}  if ( canMakeProgress(S, pc, timeout)  ) . 
 
After the proposed modification, SymPLAID’s analysis was repeated on the 
instrumented code of WuFTP and OpenSSH. This time SymPLAID could not find any 
successful attack in any of the protected applications. We are guaranteed that our 
instrumented application is now resistant to all attacks, assuming the attacker can only 
modify a single memory location.   
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6.3 On scaling the analysis 
The WuFTP stub was rather small so we were able to wait for the whole critical 
variable analysis and the exhaustive fault injection to end before embedding detectors. For 
the openSSH authentication stub, however, it took us 4 days to identify the critical variables. 
Two techniques are proposed to accelerate the analysis and the detector placement process 
and to improve the scalability of the overall approach.  
6.3.1 Technique 1: A practical approach.   
The first technique is a practical technique which is based on the following ideas:  
 It is not necessary to wait for all jobs to complete before identifying critical variables and 
critical code sections. The two properties demonstrated in section 2.2.2, along with 
partial fault injection results, can be used to identify part of the critical code sections. 
 SymPLAID’s analysis is quicker after detectors are placed. That is because we eliminate 
from the set of reachable states all the states which result in application misbehavior (all 
possible corrupted outputs).  
We use the following procedure to identify critical variables and critical code sections, and 
to place our detectors:  
 Launch SymPLAID on the non-instrumented application and let it run until some final 
state with a corrupted output field is found (cf definition of a state in Figure 4, paragraph 
4.2). The states are then parsed to identify the memory location where the fault has been 
injected and the instruction after which the fault has been injected. Each memory 
location identified is a critical variable, and each instruction identified by the analysis is 
part of the critical code section associated with the critical variable.   
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 For a given critical variable m, if the instruction I has been identified as a critical 
instruction, find the last write to m before I (IW) and the first read to m after I (lR). This is 
done by introducing some equations within SymPLAID to keep track of all read and 
write from and to a specific memory location. If the real critical section of m is [I0,Im], 
we are sure that [Iw, IR[ is included into [I0,Im].  
 Add an encoding instruction before Iw and a decoding instruction before IR.  
 Re-launch SymPLAID on the instrumented code until some final states with corrupted 
outputs are found. Then, add/replace instrumentation accordingly.  
 Iterate this process until no more final states with corrupted outputs are found by 
SymPLAID.  
Using this approach, the analysis and instrumentation time of the openSSH 
application were reduced by a factor of 4 (from 4 days to 1 day).  The fully instrumented 
application was then validated in SymPLAID. (Even after 4 days of analysis, no solution has 
been found.) 
6.3.2 Technique 2: Reducing the number of injections needed 
Technique 2 is based on a theoretical proof on how to reduce the number of injections. 
The following property is derived from Lemma 1 which we proved in section 3.2.2: all 
critical sections start with a write to the secure memory and finish right before a use of the 
secure memory.   
6.3.2.1 Lemma and proof 
Lemma 3:  
Part 1: Consider an execution flow where Iwa is a write to memory location a. If Iwa is not in 
a critical section associated with a (meaning that corrupting a after the execution of Iwa does 
46 
 
 
not allow the attacker to achieve his/her goal) then all instructions executed after Iwa and 
before the next write to a are not part of any critical section associated with a for this 
execution flow.  
Part 2: If Iwa is in a critical section associated with a, the following is true. If {Ira1, 
Ira2,…Iran } denotes the set of all read instructions to memory location a executed after Iwa and 
such that changing the data in a right before Irai, 𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑛] allows the attacker to achieve 
his/her goal, then all instructions executed between Iwa and any of these Irai, 𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑛] are part 
of a critical section associated with a.  
 
Proof: The proof is quite straightforward and derives from the previously demonstrated 
lemmas.  
Hypothesis:  
 Let Iwa be a write to memory location a.  
 First suppose that Iwa is not in a critical section associated with a.  
Three cases can happen:  
1. There is no more write to a after Iwa. 
2. The set of instructions executed between Iwa and the following write to a is empty. 
3. The set of instructions executed between Iwa and the following write to a is not 
empty.  
 Case 1:  Suppose that there is no more write to the memory location a after Iwa. Let I 
be an instruction executed after Iwa. It can be proved that I cannot be in the critical 
section of a. If I is in a critical section associated with a, then the first instruction in 
the critical section is a write to a and it is the only one in the critical section. The most 
recent write to a is Iwa; therefore if I is in a critical section associated with a, then so is 
47 
 
 
Iwa which is not possible, as we assumed that Iwa is not part of any critical section 
associated with a. That proves that any instructions executed after Iwa are not part of 
any critical sections associated with a. In order words, after Iwa there is no way an 
attacker can corrupt a and achieve his goal (under the supposed attack model). 
 Case 2: If the set of instructions executed between Iwa and the following write to a is 
empty, then there is nothing to prove as no instruction between Iwa and the following 
write to a can be in a critical section associated with a.  
 Case 3: If the set of instructions executed between Iwa and the following write to a is 
not empt,. let us choose an instruction I in this set. Suppose that I is part of a critical 
section associated with a; then again, by the lemma demonstrated in paragraph 3.2.2, 
this critical section starts with a write to a which is also the only write to a in the 
critical section. However, the latest write to a was Iwa and Iwa is not part of any critical 
section associated with a. Therefore I cannot be in a critical section associated with a.  
This concludes the proof of the first part of lemma 3: If Iwa is not in a critical section 
associated with a memory location a, then all instructions executed after Iwa and before the 
next write to a are not part of any critical section associated with a for this execution flow.  
The second part of the lemma is straightforward to demonstrate and comes directly 
from the second lemma in section 3.2.2.  
6.3.2.2 Optimized algorithm for identifying critical variables  
Based on Lemma 3, we design the algorithm presented in Figure 11 to find critical 
variables.  
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Figure 11: New algorithm to identify critical variables and critical code sections 
 
Notations:   
- Number of instructions executed: Inst 
- Average number of valid memory locations at each instructions: MemLoc 
- Number of write instructions executed: WriteInst 
- Number of read instructions executed: ReadInst   
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Using this algorithm we reduce the number of injections needed for every execution 
flow from approximately Inst * MemLoc injections to  WriteInst + ReadInst injections 
In the case of OpenSSH, we can reduce the number of injections needed from about 
473 * 50 ~ 23,650 injections to about 300 injections, which is a significant improvement.
11
 
However, this technique involves finding all reads and writes to memory along with their 
relative execution order, which can usually be done using compiler analysis. 
In conclusion, we have presented in this chapter two optimization techniques. The 
first technique, which is a practical technique applied on the openSSH application, achieved a 
4x speedup. The second technique allows reduction by a factor of 100 (in the case of 
openSSH) in the number of symbolic fault injections required to achieve an exhaustive 
application analysis.         
  
                                                          
 
11
 We approximated the number of instructions executed during a given execution flow by the total number of 
instructions in the stub. We have also approximated the number of write instructions and read instructions to the 
total number of read/write instructions. Given that not all instructions are executed during a given execution 
flow, this is an over approximation. We also approximated the number of valid memory addresses after each 
execution by an average number of memory addresses used in the stub. The order of magnitude is, however, 
relevant.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion of Other Attack 
Models 
 
In the previous chapters, we considered a specific attack model: namely, the attacker 
has the ability to modify a single memory word at any time during the execution of the 
application. This chapter discusses attacks that cannot be detected by the proposed detection 
mechanisms. In particular, control flow attacks (attacks where the execution flow of an 
application is diverted by the attacker) are classified and conditions under which such attacks 
happen are discussed.  
7.1 Control flow attacks 
 Control flow attack can either change the flow of a given application from one legal 
flow to another legal flow or from a legal flow to an illegal flow. 
7.1.1 Diverting the control flow to another legal path 
First let us consider attacks which divert the control flow of the application from a 
legal path to another legal path.
12
 
As an example, this simple fragment of code (extracted and simplified from the 
openSSH application) can be considered:  
If (strlen(storedPassword)==0) Return authenticated; 
 else Continue authentication process…  
                                                          
 
12
 A legal path is a path that can be statically determined as possible under normal execution (without attack).  
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The fragment verifies whether there is a password associated with a given user. If 
there is no password associated with the user, then the user gets authenticated without having 
to give a password. At the assembly level the fragment translates into the following 
instructions (written in SymPLAID’s format):  
… //store arguments in registers 
balr $(ret) (strlenAddr)  --- call strlen   
                    bneri $(2) $(0) (L34-0)  --- if the string’s length is not 0 jump to label L34-0 
otherwise continue execution 
movi $(2) #(1)  --- put 1 in return register 
beqii $(0) #(0) (L31-0)   --- jump to function’s return code at label L31-0 
L34-0 : … --- continue the execution process.  
L31-0 : … ---function return code 
 
A valid attack would be the following: after the call to strlen, the attacker changes the 
value in register 2 to 0. Therefore, the stored password’s length would be 0 and the attacker 
does not need to provide any password to get authenticated. A second attack could be the 
following: the strlen function is corrupted by an insider to return a wrong value. These 
attacks are very difficult to detect but also very difficult to execute. Indeed, in order to be 
able to divert the control flow to another valid control flow, the attack must happen at a 
branch instruction. In the example above, the attacks can be detected either by protecting the 
data in register 2 (or more generally return values) or, in the case of the second attack, 
checking libraries to ensure their integrity.   
7.1.2 Diverting the control flow to an illegal path 
Now let us consider attacks which divert the control flow of an application to an 
illegal path. 
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Changing the control flow of an application to an illegal path can be motivated by two 
goals: either the attacker wants to execute new code or he/she wants to skip the execution of 
existing instructions.  
Executing ―new code‖ can be done, for example, by code injection (e.g. buffer 
overflow exploit to launch a root shell) or by exploiting architectural dependent 
vulnerabilities (e.g. in x86 Linux, it is possible to execute system calls by jumping in the 
middle of existing opcodes [21], [22]) or by using a return-to-libc attack [23]. Doing so, 
however, will most probably crash the application [22] while the goal is to use the newly-
introduced code to corrupt the execution’s environment (e.g. privilege escalation). Therefore 
we do not consider this kind of attack in this study as we want to focus on attacks which 
corrupt the behavior of the compromised application rather than attacks that crash the 
application and cause denial of services.  
Bypassing instructions can be done by modifying registers and memory locations to 
change the behavior of the attacked application. Two different goals can motivate an attacker 
to bypass instructions: either the attacker wants to bypass checking mechanisms (or 
instructions added to guarantee security and reliability properties) or he/she wants to bypass 
some essential functionalities within the application (e.g. escape the comparison of the stored 
password with the user provided password). Bypassing the checking mechanism in itself 
cannot achieve the attacker’s goal. Indeed, in the case of the protection mechanism described 
in previous chapters, it is not sufficient to bypass the decoding instructions; the attacker also 
needs to corrupt something else to alter the behavior of the application. We argue that 
bypassing computational elements is weaker than modifying directly registers and memory 
locations. Indeed, bypassing computational elements without crashing the application relies 
on the fact that registers and memory locations not assigned because of the attack already 
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contain the desired value. For example, bypassing the comparison of the stored and the user-
given passwords relies on the fact the result register/flag already contains the desired value. 
We argue that exhaustive fault injections into registers and memory locations can model the 
effect of such control flow attacks on the application’s behavior. The following code segment 
illustrates the idea.  
 0:  movi $(2) #(0) --- put 0 in register 2  
 1:  sw $(2) 36$(30)  --- stores the value of register 2 in memory 
 2:  movi $(2) #(1) --- put 1 in register 2 
 3:  … 
Consider the following control flow attack. The attacker skips instruction 2 to force 
register 2 to contain the value 0 instead of 1 before the execution instruction 3. By injecting 
the value 0 in register 2 after the execution of the instruction 2 it is possible to model the 
effect of such control flow attacks. If the application is not affected by such an injection, or if 
the application crashes, then we know that the control flow attack cannot succeed either. 
  
54 
 
 
Chapter 8: Related Works 
Many studies propose protection mechanisms against memory attacks. We can 
broadly classify them into two categories: those which ensure that vulnerabilities are patched 
or cannot be exploited and those which aim to guarantee a correct behavior of the protected 
application or system.  
8.1 Preventing vulnerabilities from being exploited 
1. The use of canary value has been proposed by [24]. The authors propose to insert a 
canary value or a canary word at the end of each buffer on the stack. If a buffer overflow 
occurs, the canary value will be the first word to be overwritten and a failed verification of 
the canary value will detect such attacks. However, this technique can only protect against 
stack-smashing attacks.     
2. Libsafe [8] proposes to intercept, at runtime, calls to known vulnerable C library 
functions (e.g. strcpy, strcat, getpw, gets) and replaces them with safer functions which do 
not allow buffer overflow. However, the technique only protects a very limited set of 
functions. 
 3. Address space randomization techniques [25], [26], [27], [28] have been proposed 
to obfuscate the layout of the memory space, preventing attackers from identifying control 
data or critical data in memory. However, [23] claims that the randomization can be broken 
by repeated, undetected attacks on the system.  
8.2 Enforcing an application or system’s correct behavior 
1. Program Shepherding [29] restricts the amount of executable code and control 
transfers (branches, call to library functions) based on a security policy. The idea is to prevent 
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attackers from executing injected code or to change the control flow of a highly privileged 
application in order to gain control of a system.  
2. [21]  proposes to enforce at runtime the control flow integrity of an application. The 
idea is to ensure that the software execution follows a path of a control flow graph 
determined ahead of time (source code, binary analysis or execution profiling).  
Both techniques (Program Shepherding and Control Flow Integrity) aim to ensure that 
control flows cannot be diverted at runtime by attackers. However, they do not consider non-
control data corruption attacks. [30] demonstrates that non-control data corruption is a serious 
threat and can be used to take control of an application. [31] shows that non-control data 
corruption attacks are realistic and practical on real world applications.  
3. Information Flow Signature [32] guarantees the integrity of critical data by 
insuring the control flow and the data flow integrity within each critical data’s backward slice. 
The technique, however, relies on users to identify critical data.  
4.  WIT [7] uses points-to analysis at compile time to compute the control-flow graph 
and the set of objects that can be written by each instruction in the program. It then enforces 
at run time to prevent instructions from modifying data that are not in the statically computed 
set. However, as the technique is not selective, it involves tagging all memory data and all 
write instructions. In the technique proposed in this thesis, we only focus on critical data 
identified by formal verification.  
The detectors proposed in this study fit in this second category. The goal is to ensure 
that formally identified critical memory locations cannot be corrupted by attackers during the 
critical code sections. However, by designing detectors based on formal analysis, this work 
also provides strong guarantees about the detection mechanism’s coverage.    
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Chapter 9: Conclusion and Future Work 
9.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has shown that it is possible to leverage existing formal tools to design and 
verify protection mechanisms which can achieve a very high coverage. More precisely, we 
evaluated an existing formal tool (SymPLAID) and used it to find critical variables and their 
associated critical code sections. From the critical variables and the properties of the critical 
sections, we designed a detection mechanism with high coverage. We implemented the 
designed detection mechanism within SymPLAID itself, instrumented two applications, 
namely the OpenSSH authentication stub and WuFTP logging stub, and proved that given the 
attack model we assumed, our detection mechanism protects all critical memory locations 
identified by SymPLAID. Furthermore, we proved several properties about the critical 
sections that allow us to scale the analysis process. 
 9.2 Future work 
9.2.1 Scalability of SymPLAID  
Two techniques to scale the analysis time of SymPLAID for single memory address 
injections are presented in this thesis. These techniques offer ways of reducing computation 
time while still providing exhaustive analysis. Note that the techniques described in this work 
do not improve the scalability of the tool itself. The first technique relies on properties of the 
critical code sections as well as on the proposed detectors to reduce the number of reachable 
states. The second technique leverages the critical code sections’ properties to reduce the 
number of symbolic fault injections needed.  
It is not clear that the techniques proposed in this work can be directly applied to 
improve the scalability of symbolic fault injections into registers, the program counter or 
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several memory locations. For example, as the program counter is updated and read at each 
instruction, both techniques presented in this work will be unable to efficiently scale an 
exhaustive fault injection into the program counter. In this case, the large analysis time is 
mostly due to the amount of reachable states introduced by one single error in the program 
counter.  Indeed, if the program counter contains an err symbol, any instruction within the 
application’s text segment can be fetched as the next instruction, which creates as many paths 
as the number of instructions in the application for the model checker to explore.      
Model abstraction is widely used to address the scalability problem in formal 
verification [33]. The idea is to verify a less detailed model of the system to avoid the state 
explosion problem. It could be interesting explore how one can further abstract the machine 
model in order to keep the accuracy of the analysis and reduce the state search space.  
It could also be interesting to see if there is a way of breaking the analysis of a large 
program into analysis of smaller pieces.  
9.2.2 Studying new attack models within the framework 
In this thesis, only the attack model of a single memory corruption per attack is 
considered. It would be interesting to consider an attack model where register values can be 
corrupted. It is not clear, however, how one could map those direct register corruptions to 
higher level attacks. To the best of our knowledge, attackers generally have to go through 
corrupting memory in order to corrupt register values (e.g. when registers are dumped into 
memory when a function call happens).  
It would also be interesting to consider attack models where the attacker can introduce 
several errors. That would require some changes within SymPLAID, in particular in the 
constraint solver in order to allow several symbolic errors to propagate. 
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9.2.3 Adapting SymPLAID for x86 
 Currently, SymPLAID can only model the execution of MIPS applications. However, 
as most of the attacks and applications run on x86, it would be interesting to model the x86 
instruction set and machine model to test whether the technique applied in this thesis can be 
transferred to applications running on x86.  
9.2.4 Building detectors 
 Currently the detectors designed in this study have not been implemented either in 
software or hardware. A software approach would have to implement a ―trusted memory 
section,‖ which could be done, for example, by encrypting duplicated data. The detectors can 
be implemented in hardware as a new security module within the RSE framework [34] 
developed in our research group. The module would duplicate, store, and check the integrity 
of data stored in critical variables.   
 Once they are implemented, we will be able to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed detectors.  
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